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  • 09月25日 16:59
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  • 原文摘要
  • 本文研究公平感对由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链中的定价决策的影响,其中供应商决定批发价格,零售商在接受供应商批发价格合同之后决定零售价格,市场需求受到零售价格的线性影响.采用管理实验方法得出,首先,供应商的批发价格和零售商的零售价格均分别低于完全理性假设下的均衡解;供应商是利他性的,即,乐于看到零售商收益的增加,并且,供应商认为零售商是完全理性的,即零售商的决策目标是最大化自身收益;然而,零售商却是刻毒性的,即乐于看到供应商收益的减少.其次,批发价格的变异度大于零售价格的,即供应商决策的难度大于零售商的.给管理者的启示是:供应商应考虑零售商的刻毒性的特征,降低批发价格,以提高零售商接受供应商所提批发价格的概率;此外,还应该为供应商提供辅助决策手段,以降低批发价格的变异度,提高决策的准确性 This study considers fairness''s effect on the pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and one retailer.The supplier decides the wholesale price of the single product firstly, and then the retailer decides the selling price after accepting supplier''s contract.Finally, the market demand is realized as a linear function of selling price unless the retailer rejects supplier''s contract and then both echelons will receive nothing.Based on the managerial experiment, this study indicates that: (i) both of the supplier''s wholesale price and the retailer''s selling price are lower than the theoretical results under perfect rationality assumption;(ii) specifically, the supplier is altruistic and believes that the retailer selfishly aims at maximizing his own profit, however, the retailer is spiteful;(iii) the coefficient of variability of the wholesale price is larger than that of the selling price.The managerial insights are that in the two-echelon supply chain, the supplier should adjust his belief on retailer''s fairness concern as being spiteful instead of being selfish, and more decision-making support methods should be provided to the supplier to improve the quality of the wholesale price decision.
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